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In a 2002 editorial published in The Economist, the followingwarning was given: “Genetics may yet threaten privacy, killautonomy, make society homogeneous and gut the concept
of human nature. But neuroscience could do all of these things
first.”1 The genome was fully sequenced in 2001, and there has
not been one resulting major advance in therapeutic medicine
since. Thus, even in its most natural applied domain—medi-
cine—genetics has not had the far-reaching consequences that
were envisioned.2 The same has been true of various other sci-
ences that were predicted to revolutionize the law, including
behavioral psychology, sociology, and psychodynamic psychol-
ogy, to name but a few. This will also be true of neuroscience,
which is simply the newest science on the block. Neuroscience
is not going to do the terrible things The Economist fears, at
least not in the foreseeable future. Neuroscience has many
things to say, but not nearly as much as people would hope,
especially in relation to law. At most, in the near to intermedi-
ate term, neuroscience may make modest contributions to
legal policy and case adjudication. Nonetheless, there has been
irrational exuberance about the potential contribution of neu-
roscience, an issue I have addressed previously and referred to
as “brain overclaim syndrome.”3
I first address the law’s motivation and the motivation of
some advocates to turn to science to solve the very hard nor-
mative problems that law addresses. The next part discusses the
law’s psychology and its concepts of the person and responsi-
bility. Then I consider the general relation of neuroscience to
law, which I characterize as the issue of “translation.” The fol-
lowing part canvasses various distractions that have bedeviled
clear thinking about the relation of scientific, causal accounts of
behavior to responsibility. Next, I examine the limits of neuro-
law and consider why neurolaw does not pose a genuinely rad-
ical challenge to the law’s concepts of the person and responsi-
bility. The penultimate part makes a case for cautious optimism
about the contribution that neuroscience may make to law in
the near and intermediate term. A brief conclusion follows.
THE SOURCE OF NEUROEXUBERANCE
Everyone understands that legal issues are normative,
addressing how we should regulate our lives in a complex soci-
ety. How do we live together? What are the duties we owe each
other? For violations of those duties, when is the state justified
in imposing the most afflictive—but sometimes warranted—
exercises of state power, criminal blame, and punishment?4
When should we do this, to whom, and how much?
Virtually every legal issue is contested—consider criminal
responsibility, for example—and there is always room for
debate about policy, doctrine, and adjudication. In a recent
book, Professor Robin Feldman has argued that law lacks the
courage forthrightly to address the difficult normative issues
that it faces.5 The law therefore adopts what Feldman terms an
“internalizing” and an “externalizing” strategy for using science
to try to avoid the difficulties. In the internalizing strategy, the
law adopts scientific criteria as legal criteria. A futuristic exam-
ple might be using neural criteria for criminal responsibility. In
the externalizing strategy, the law turns to scientific or clinical
experts to make the decision. An example would be using
forensic clinicians to decide whether a criminal defendant is
competent to stand trial and then simply rubberstamping the
clinician’s opinion.6 Neither strategy is successful, because each
avoids facing the hard questions and impedes legal evolution
and progress. Professor Feldman concludes, and I agree, that
the law does not err by using science too little, as is commonly
claimed. Rather, it errs by using it too much because the law is
too insecure about its resources and capacities to do justice.
A fascinating question is why so many enthusiasts seem to
have extravagant expectations about the contribution of neuro-
science to law, especially criminal law. Here is my speculation
about the source. Many people intensely dislike the concept
and practice of retributive justice, thinking that they are presci-
entific and harsh. Their hope is that the new neuroscience will
convince the law at last that determinism is true, no offender is
genuinely responsible, and the only logical conclusion is that
the law should adopt a consequentially based prediction/pre-
vention system of social control guided by the knowledge of the
neuroscientist-kings who will finally have supplanted the pla-
tonic philosopher-kings.7 On a more modest level, many advo-
cates think that neuroscience may not revolutionize criminal
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justice, but neuroscience will demonstrate that many more
offenders should be excused and do not deserve the harsh pun-
ishments imposed by the United States criminal justice system.
Four decades ago, our criminal justice system would have been
using psychodynamic psychology for the same purpose. More
recently, genetics has been employed in a similar manner. The
impulse, however, is clear: jettison desert, or at least mitigate
judgments of desert. As will be shown below, however, these
advocates often adopt an untenable theory of mitigation or an
excuse that quickly collapses into the nihilistic conclusion that
no one is really criminally responsible.
THE LAW’S PSYCHOLOGY, CONCEPT OF THE PERSON,
AND RESPONSIBILITY
Criminal law presupposes a “folk-psychological” view of
the person and behavior. This psychological theory explains
behavior in part by mental states such as desires, beliefs, inten-
tions, willingness, and plans. Biological and other psychologi-
cal and sociological variables also play a causal role, but folk
psychology considers mental states fundamental to a full
causal explanation and understanding of human action.
Lawyers, philosophers, and scientists argue about the defini-
tions of mental states and theories of action, but that does not
undermine the general claim that mental states are fundamen-
tal. Indeed, the arguments and evidence that disputants use to
convince others presuppose the folk-psychological view of the
person. Brains do not convince each other, people do. Folk
psychology presupposes only that human action can be ratio-
nalized by mental state explanations or will be in response to
reasons—including incentives—under the right conditions.
For example, the folk-psychological explanation for why
you are reading this article is, roughly, that you desire to
understand the relation of neuroscience to criminal responsi-
bility or to law generally. You believe that reading the article
will help fulfill that desire, so you formed the intention to read
it. This is a practical, rather than a deductive, syllogism. Brief
reflection should indicate that the law’s psychology must be a
folk-psychological theory, a view of the person as a con-
scious—and potentially self-conscious—creature who forms
and acts on intentions that are the product of the person’s other
mental states. We are the sort of creatures who can act for and
respond to reasons. The law treats persons generally as inten-
tional creatures and not simply as mechanistic forces of nature.
Law is primarily action-guiding and is not able to guide
people directly and indirectly unless people are capable of
using rules as premises in their reasoning about how they
should behave. Unless people could be guided by law, it would
be useless (and perhaps incoherent) as an action-guiding sys-
tem of rules. Legal rules are action-guiding primarily because
these rules provide an agent with good moral or prudential rea-
sons for forbearance or action. Human behavior can be modi-
fied by means other than influencing deliberation, and human
beings do not always deliberate before they act. Nonetheless,
the law presupposes folk psychology even when we most
habitually follow the legal rules. Unless people are capable of
understanding and then using legal rules to guide their con-
duct, the law is powerless to affect human behavior.
The legal view of the person does not hold that people must
always reason or consistently behave rationally according to
some preordained, normative
notion of rationality. Rather, the
law’s view is that people are both
capable of acting for reasons and
capable of minimal rationality
according to predominantly con-
ventional, socially constructed
standards. The type of rationality
the law requires is the ordinary
person’s common-sense view of
rationality, not the technical
notion that might be acceptable within the disciplines of eco-
nomics, philosophy, psychology, computer science, and the
like.
Virtually everything for which agents deserve to be praised,
blamed, rewarded, or punished is the product of mental causa-
tion and, in principle, is responsive to reasons, including
incentives. Machines may cause harm, but they cannot do
wrong, and they cannot violate expectations about how people
ought to live together. Machines do not deserve praise, blame,
reward, punishment, concern, or respect because they exist or
because of the results they cause. Only people, intentional
agents with the potential to act, can do wrong and violate
expectations of what they owe each other.
Many scientists and some philosophers of mind and action
might consider folk psychology to be a primitive or prescien-
tific view of human behavior. For the foreseeable future, how-
ever, the law will be based on the folk-psychological model of
the person and behavior described. Until and unless scientific
discoveries convince us that our view of ourselves is radically
wrong, the basic explanatory apparatus of folk psychology will
remain central. It is vital that we not lose sight of this model
lest we fall into confusion when various claims based on neu-
roscience are made. If any science is to have appropriate influ-
ence on current law and legal decision-making, the science
must be relevant to and translated into the law’s folk-psycho-
logical framework (as shall be discussed in more detail below).
All of the law’s doctrinal criteria for criminal responsibility
are folk psychological. Begin with the definitional criteria, the
elements of crime. The “voluntary” act requirement is defined,
roughly, as an intentional bodily movement—or omission in
cases in which the person has a duty to act—done in a reason-
ably integrated state of consciousness. Other than crimes of
strict liability, all crimes also require a culpable mental state,
such as purpose, knowledge, or recklessness. All affirmative
defenses of justification and excuse involve an inquiry into the
person’s mental state, such as the belief that self-defensive force
was necessary, or the lack of knowledge of right from wrong.
Our folk-psychological concepts of criminal responsibility
follow logically from the action-guiding nature of law itself,
from its folk-psychological concept of the person and action,
and from the aim of achieving retributive justice, which holds
that no one should be punished unless they deserve it and pun-
ished no more than they deserve. The general capacity for ratio-
nality is the primary condition for responsibility, and the lack of
that capacity is the primary condition for excusing a person. If
human beings were not rational creatures who could under-
stand the good reasons for action and were not capable of con-
forming to legal requirements through intentional action or for-
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bearance, the law could not ade-
quately guide action and would
not be just. Legally responsible
agents are therefore people who
have the general capacity to
grasp and be guided by good rea-
son in particular legal contexts.8
In cases of excuse, the agent
who has done something wrong acts for a reason, but is either
incapable of rationality generally or incapable on the specific
occasion in question. This explains, for example, why young
children and some people with mental disorders are not held
responsible. The lack of capacity for rationality that is neces-
sary to find the agent not responsible is a moral, social, politi-
cal and, ultimately, legal issue. It is not a scientific, medical,
psychological, or psychiatric issue.
Compulsion or coercion is also an excusing condition. Lit-
eral compulsion exists when the person’s bodily movement is
a pure mechanism that is not rationalizable by reference to the
agent’s mental states. These cases defeat the requirement of a
“voluntary act.” For example, a tremor or spasm produced by
a neurological disorder is not an action because it is not inten-
tional and, therefore, defeats the ascription of a voluntary act.
Metaphorical compulsion exists when an agent acts inten-
tionally, but in response to some hard choice imposed on the
agent through no fault of his or her own. For example, if a
miscreant holds a gun to an agent’s head and threatens to kill
her unless she kills another innocent person, it would be
wrong for her to kill under these circumstances. Nevertheless,
the law may decide as a normative matter to excuse the act of
intentional killing because the agent was motivated by a threat
so great that it would be supremely difficult for most citizens
to resist. Cases involving internal compulsive states are more
difficult to conceptualize because it is difficult to define and
assess loss of control.9 The cases that most fit this category are
“disorders of desire,” such as addictions and sexual disorders.
The question is why these acting agents lack control, but
other people with strong desires do not. If people frequently
yield to their apparently very strong desires at great social,
medical, occupational, financial, and legal cost to themselves,
agents will often say they could not help themselves, they
were not in control, and an excuse or mitigation is therefore
warranted. But why mitigation or excuse should obtain is dif-
ficult to understand.
LOST IN TRANSLATION? LEGAL RELEVANCE AND THE
NEED FOR TRANSLATION
What in principle is the possible relation of neuroscience to
law? We must begin with a distinction between internal rele-
vance and external relevance. An internal contribution or cri-
tique accepts the general coherence and legitimacy of a set of
legal doctrines, practices, or institutions, and attempts to
explain or alter them. For example, an internal contribution to
criminal responsibility may suggest the need for doctrinal
reform of, say, the insanity defense, but it would not suggest
that the notion of criminal responsibility is itself incoherent or
illegitimate. By contrast, an externally relevant critique sug-
gests that the doctrines, practices, or institutions are incoher-
ent, illegitimate, or unjustified. Because a radical, external cri-
tique has little possibility of success at present (as is explained
below), I make the simplifying assumption that the contribu-
tions of neuroscience will be internal and thus will need to be
translated into the law’s folk-psychological concepts.
The law’s criteria for responsibility and competence are
essentially behavioral—acts and mental states. The criteria of
neuroscience are mechanistic—neural structure and function.
Is the apparent chasm between those two types of discourse
bridgeable? This is a familiar question in the field of mental
health law,10 but there is even greater dissonance in neurolaw.
Psychiatry and psychology sometimes treat behavior mecha-
nistically, sometimes treat it folk psychologically, and some-
times blend the two. In many cases, the psychological sciences
are quite close to folk psychology in approach. Neuroscience,
in contrast, is purely mechanistic and eschews folk-psycholog-
ical concepts and discourse. Neurons and neural networks do
not act intentionally for reasons. They have no sense of past,
present, and future, and no aspirations. Thus, the gap will be
harder to bridge.
The brain does enable the mind (even if we do not know
how this occurs). Therefore, facts we learn about brains in gen-
eral or about a specific brain could in principle provide useful
information about mental states and about human capacities in
general and in specific cases. Some believe that this conclusion
is a category error.11 This is a plausible view, and perhaps it is
correct. If it is, then the whole subject of neurolaw is empty,
and there was no point in writing this article in the first place.
Let us therefore bracket this pessimistic view and determine
what follows from the more optimistic position that what we
learn about the brain and nervous system can be potentially
helpful to resolving questions of criminal responsibility if the
findings are properly translated into the law’s psychological
framework.
The question is whether the new neuroscience is legally rel-
evant because it makes a proposition about responsibility or
competence more or less likely to be true. Any legal criterion
must be established independently, and biological evidence
must be translated into the criminal law’s folk-psychological
criteria. That is, the expert must be able to explain precisely
how the neuroevidence bears on whether the agent acted,
formed the required mens rea, or met the criteria for an excus-
ing condition. In the context of competence evaluations, the
expert must explain precisely how the neuroevidence bears on
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whether the subject was capable of meeting the law’s func-
tional criteria. If the evidence is not directly relevant, the
expert should be able to explain the chain of inference from
the indirect evidence to the law’s criteria. At present, as I
explain below, few such data exist, but neuroscience is advanc-
ing so rapidly that such data may exist in the near or medium
term. Moreover, the argument is conceptual and does not
depend on any particular neuroscience findings.
DANGEROUS DISTRACTIONS CONCERNING NEURO-
SCIENCE AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND COMPE-
TENCE
This part considers a number of related issues that are often
thought to be relevant to criminal responsibility and compe-
tence but that are in fact irrelevant, confusing, and distracting:
free will, causation as an excuse, causation as compulsion, pre-
diction as an excuse, dualism, and the non-efficacy of mental
states. It is important to correct these errors because much of
the unjustified legal exuberance about the contributions of
neurolaw flows from them. The legal exuberance also flows,
however, from unrealistic expectations about the scientific
accomplishments of neuroscience. A later part of this article
addresses the scientific exuberance.
Contrary to what many people believe and what judges and
others sometimes say, free will is not a legal criterion that is
part of any doctrine, and it is not even foundational for crimi-
nal responsibility.12 Criminal law doctrines are fully consistent
with the truth of determinism or universal causation that
allegedly undermine the foundations of responsibility. Even if
determinism is true, some people act and some people do not.
Some people form prohibited mental states and some do not.
Some people are legally insane or act under duress when they
commit crimes, but most defendants are not legally insane or
acting under duress. Moreover, these distinctions matter to
moral and legal theories of responsibility and fairness that we
have reason to endorse. Thus, law addresses problems gen-
uinely related to responsibility, including consciousness, the
formation of mental states such as intention and knowledge,
the capacity for rationality, and compulsion. The law, however,
never addresses the presence or absence of free will.
When most people use the term “free will” in the context of
legal responsibility, they are typically using it loosely as a syn-
onym for the conclusion that the defendant was or was not
criminally responsible. They typically have reached this con-
clusion for reasons that do not involve free will—for example,
that the defendant was legally insane or acted under duress—
but such use of the term only perpetuates misunderstanding
and confusion. Once the legal criteria for an excuse have been
met—and no excuse includes lack of free will as a criterion—
the defendant will be excused without any reference whatso-
ever to free will as an independent ground for the excuse.
There is a genuine metaphysical problem regarding free
will, which is whether human beings have the capacity to act
uncaused by anything other than themselves and whether this
capacity is a necessary founda-
tion for holding anyone legally or
morally accountable for criminal
conduct. Philosophers and others
have debated these issues in vari-
ous forms for millennia and there
is no resolution in sight. Indeed,
some people might think that the
problem is insoluble. This is a
philosophical issue, but it is not a
problem for the law, and neuro-
science raises no new challenge
to this conclusion. Solving the
metaphysical free-will problem
might have profound implications for responsibility doctrines
and practices, such as blame and punishment, but having or
lacking libertarian freedom is not a criterion of any civil or
criminal law doctrine.
Neuroscience is simply the most recent, mechanistic causal
science that appears deterministically to explain behavior.
Neuroscience thus joins social structural variables, behavior-
ism, genetics, and other scientific explanations that have also
been deterministic explanations for behavior. In principle,
however, neuroscience adds nothing new, even if neuroscience
is a better, more persuasive science than some of its predeces-
sors. No science, including neuroscience, can demonstrate that
libertarian free will does or does not exist. As long as free will
in the strong sense is not foundational for just blame and pun-
ishment and is not a criterion at the doctrinal level—which it
is not—the truth of determinism or universal causation poses
no threat to legal responsibility. Neuroscience may help shed
light on folk-psychological excusing conditions, such as
automatism or legal insanity, but the truth of determinism is
not an excusing condition. The law will be fundamentally
challenged only if neuroscience or any other science can con-
clusively demonstrate that the law’s psychology is wrong and
that we are not the type of creatures for whom mental states are
causally effective. This is a different question from whether
determinism undermines responsibility, however, and this arti-
cle returns to it below.
A related confusion is that behavior is excused if it is
caused, but causation per se is not a legal or moral mitigating
or excusing condition. I termed this confusion the “funda-
mental psycholegal error.”13 At most, causal explanations can
only provide evidence concerning whether a genuine excusing
condition, such as lack of rational capacity, was present. For
example, suppose a life marked by poverty and abuse played a
predisposing causal role in a defendant’s criminal behavior or
that an alleged new mental syndrome played a causal role in
explaining criminal conduct. The claim is often made that
such causes—for which the agent is not responsible—should
be an excusing or mitigating position per se, but this claim is
false.
All behavior is the product of the necessary and sufficient
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causal conditions without which
the behavior would not have
occurred, including brain causa-
tion, which is always part of the
causal explanation for any behav-
ior. If causation were an excusing
condition per se, then no one
would be responsible for any
behavior. Some people might
welcome such a conclusion and
believe that responsibility is
impossible, but this is not the
legal and moral world we inhabit.
The law holds most adults responsible for most of their con-
duct, and genuine excusing conditions are limited. Thus,
unless the person’s history or mental condition, for example,
provides evidence of an existing excusing or mitigating condi-
tion, such as lack of rational capacity, there is no reason for
excuse or mitigation.
Even a genuinely abnormal cause is not per se an excusing
condition. For example, imagine an armed robber who suffers
from intermittent hypomania and who only robs when he is
clinically hypomanic because only then does he feel suffi-
ciently energetic and confident. In other words, the hypomania
is a “but for” cause of his robberies. Nevertheless, he would
not be excused for an armed robbery because hypomania sel-
dom compromises rational capacity sufficiently to warrant an
excuse. If he committed an armed robbery under the influence
of a delusional belief his mania produced, then he might be
excused by reason of legal insanity. In that case, the excusing
condition would be compromised rationality and not the
mania per se. In short, a neuroscientific causal explanation for
criminal conduct, like any other type of causal explanation,
does not per se mitigate or excuse. It only provides evidence
that might help the law resolve whether a genuine excuse
existed, or it may in the future provide data that might be a
guide to prophylactic or rehabilitative measures.
Compulsion is a genuine mitigating or excusing condition,
but causation—including brain causation—is not the equiva-
lent of compulsion. As we have seen, compulsion may be
either literal or metaphorical and normative. It is crucial to rec-
ognize that most human action is not plausibly the result of
either type of compulsion, but all human behavior is caused by
its necessary and sufficient causes—including brain causation.
Even abnormal causes are not necessarily compelling. To illus-
trate, suppose that a person has weak pedophilic urges and
weak sexual urges in general. If this person molested a child,
there would be no ground for a compulsion excuse. If causa-
tion was the equivalent of compulsion, all behavior would be
compelled and no one would be responsible. Once again, this
is not a plausible account of the law’s responsibility conditions.
Causal information from neuroscience might help us resolve
questions concerning whether legal compulsion existed, or it
might be a guide to prophylactic or rehabilitative measures
when dealing with plausible legal compulsion. Causation,
however, is not per se compulsion.
Causal knowledge, whether from neuroscience or any other
science, can enhance the accuracy of behavioral predictions,
but predictability is also not a per-se excusing or mitigating
condition—even if the predictability of the behavior is perfect.
To understand this, consider how many things we do that are
perfectly predictable but for which there is no plausible excus-
ing or mitigating condition. If the variables that enhance pre-
diction also produce a genuine excusing or mitigating condi-
tion, then excuse or mitigation is justified for the latter reason
and independent of the prediction.
For example, recent research demonstrates that a history of
childhood abuse coupled with a specific, genetically produced
enzyme abnormality that produces a neurotransmitter deficit
vastly increases the risk that a person will behave antisocially
as an adolescent or young adult.14 Does this mean that an
offender with this gene-by-environment interaction is not
responsible or less responsible? No. The offender may not be
fully responsible or responsible at all, but not because there is
a causal explanation. What is the intermediary excusing or
mitigating principle? Are these people, for instance, more
impulsive? Are they lacking rationality? What is the actual
excusing or mitigating condition?
Again, causation is not compulsion, and predictability is not
an excuse. Just because an offender is caused to do something
or is predictable does not mean that the offender was com-
pelled to do the crime charged or is otherwise not responsible.
Brain causation—or any other kind of causation—does not
mean that we are automatons, not really acting agents at all, or
otherwise excused.
Most informed people are not dualists concerning the rela-
tion between the mind and the brain. That is, they no longer
think that our minds—or souls—are independent of our brains
and bodies more generally and can somehow exert a causal
influence over our bodies. It may seem as if law’s emphasis on
the importance of mental states as causing behavior is based on
a prescientific, outmoded form of dualism, but this is not the
case. Although the brain enables the mind, we have no idea
how this occurs and have no idea how action is possible.15
It is clear that, at the least, mental states are dependent
upon or supervene on brain states, but neither neuroscience
nor any other science has demonstrated that mental states do
not play an independent and partially causal role.
Despite our lack of understanding of the mind-brain-action
relation, some scientists and philosophers question whether
mental states have any causal effect, thus treating mental states
as psychic appendixes that evolution has created but that have
no genuine function. These claims are not strawpersons. They
are made by serious, thoughtful people.16 As discussed below,
if accepted, they would create a complete and revolutionary
paradigm shift in the law of criminal responsibility and com-
petence (and more widely). Thus, this claim is an external cri-
tique and must be understood as such. Moreover, given our
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current state of knowledge, there is little scientific or concep-
tual reason to accept it.17
In conclusion, legal actors concerned with criminal law pol-
icy, doctrine, and adjudication must always keep the folk-psy-
chological view present in their minds when considering
claims or evidence from neuroscience, and must always ques-
tion how the science is legally relevant to the law’s action and
mental states criteria. The truth of determinism, causation, and
predictability do not in themselves answer any doctrinal or
policy issue.
THE LIMITS OF NEUROLAW: THE PRESENT LIMITS OF
NEUROSCIENCE
Most generally, the relation of brain, mind, and action is one
of the hardest problems in all of science. Again, we have no
idea how the brain enables the mind or how action is possi-
ble.18 The brain-mind-action relation is a mystery. For exam-
ple, we would like to know the difference between a neuro-
muscular spasm and intentionally moving one’s arm in exactly
the same way. The former is a purely mechanical motion,
whereas the latter is an action, but we cannot explain the dif-
ference between the two. We know that a functioning brain is
a necessary condition for having mental states and for acting.
After all, if your brain is dead, you have no mental states, are
not acting, and indeed are not doing much of anything at all.
Still, we do not know how mental states and action are caused.
Despite the astonishing advances in neuroimaging and
other neuroscientific methods, we still do not have sophisti-
cated causal knowledge of how the brain works generally, and
we have little information that is legally relevant. This is
unsurprising. The scientific problems are fearsomely difficult.
Only in the last decade have researchers begun to accumulate
much data from functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), which is the technology that has generated most of the
legal interest. Moreover, virtually no studies have been per-
formed to address specifically legal questions.
Before turning to the specific reasons for neuromodesty, a
few preliminary points of general applicability must be
addressed. The first and most important is contained in the
message of the prior part. Causation by biological variables,
including abnormal biological variables, does not per se create
an excusing or mitigating condition. Any excusing condition
must be established independently. The goal is always to trans-
late the biological evidence into the criminal law’s folk-psy-
chological criteria.
Assessing criminal responsibility involves a retrospective
evaluation of the defendant’s mental states at the time of the
crime. No criminal wears a portable scanner or other neurode-
tection device that provides a
measurement at the time of the
crime, at least not yet. Further,
neuroscience is insufficiently
developed to detect specific,
legally relevant mental content
or to provide a sufficiently accu-
rate diagnostic marker for even a
severe mental disorder.19 Never-
theless, certain aspects of neural
structure and function that bear on legally relevant capacities,
such as the capacity for rationality and control, may be tempo-
rally stable in general or in individual cases. If they are, neu-
roevidence may permit a reasonably valid retrospective inference
about the defendant’s rational and control capacities and their
impact on criminal behavior. This will of course depend on the
existence of adequate science to do this. We currently lack such
science, but future research may provide the necessary data.
Questions concerning competence or predictions of future
behavior are based on a subject’s present condition. Thus, the
problems besetting the retrospective responsibility analysis do
not apply to such issues. The criteria for competence are func-
tional. They ask whether the subject can perform some task—
such as understanding the nature of a criminal proceeding or
understanding a treatment option that is offered—at a level the
law considers normatively acceptable to warrant respecting the
subject’s choice and autonomy.
Now, let us consider the specific grounds for neuromodesty
in cognitive and social neuroscience, the subdisciplines most
relevant to law. At present, most neuroscience studies on
human beings involve very small numbers of subjects,
although this phenomenon is starting to change. Most of the
studies have been done on college and university students,
who are hardly a random sample of the population generally
and of criminal offenders specifically. There is also a serious
question of whether findings based on subjects’ behavior and
brain activity in a scanner would apply to real world situations.
Further, most studies average the neurodata over the subjects,
and the average finding may not accurately describe the brain
structure or function of any actual subject in the study. Repli-
cations are few, which is especially important for law. Policy
and adjudication should not be influenced by findings that are
insufficiently established, and replications of findings are cru-
cial to our confidence in a result. Finally, the neuroscience of
cognition and interpersonal behavior is largely in its infancy
and what is known is quite coarse-grained and correlational,
rather than fine-grained and causal.20 What is being investi-
gated is an association between a task in the scanner and brain
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activity. These studies do not
demonstrate that the brain
activity is either a necessary,
sufficient or predisposing
causal condition for the
behavioral task that is being
done in the scanner. Any lan-
guage that suggests other-
wise—such as claiming that
some brain region is the
neural substrate for the
behavior—is simply not justi-
fiable based on the methodol-
ogy of most studies. Moreover, activity in the same region may
be associated with diametrically opposite behavioral phenom-
ena—for example, love and hate.
There are also technical and research design difficulties. It
takes many mathematical transformations to get from the raw
fMRI data to the images of the brain that are increasingly famil-
iar. Explaining these transformations is beyond me, but I do
understand that the likelihood that an investigator will find a
statistically significant result depends on how the researcher
sets the threshold for significance. There is dispute about this,
and the threshold levels are conventional. If the threshold
changes, so does the outcome. I have been convinced by neu-
roscience colleagues that many such technical difficulties have
largely been solved, but research design and potentially unjus-
tified inferences from the studies are still an acute problem. It
is extraordinarily difficult to control for all conceivable arti-
facts. Consequently, there are often problems of over-inference.
Finally, it is also an open question whether accurate inferences
or predictions about individuals are possible using group data
when that group includes the individual. This is a very contro-
versial topic, but even if it is difficult or impossible now, it may
become easier in the future. Over time, however, all these
problems may ease as imaging and other techniques become
less expensive and more accurate, research designs become
more sophisticated, and the sophistication of the science
increases generally.
Virtually all neuroscience studies of potential interest to the
law involve some behavior that has already been identified as
of interest, and the point of the study is to identify that behav-
ior’s neural correlates. Neuroscientists do not go on general
fishing expeditions.21 There is usually some bit of behavior—
such as addiction, schizophrenia, or impulsivity—that investi-
gators would like to understand better by investigating its
neural correlates. To do this properly presupposes that the
researchers have already identified and validated the behavior
under neuroscientific investigation. Thus, neurodata can be no
more valid than the behavior with which it is correlated.
On occasion, the neuroscience might suggest that the
behavior is not well characterized, or is neurally indistinguish-
able from other, seemingly different behavior. In general, how-
ever, the existence of legally relevant behavior will already be
apparent before the neuroscientific investigation is begun. For
example, some people are grossly out of touch with reality. If,
as a result, they do not understand right from wrong, we
excuse them because they lack such knowledge. We might
learn a great deal about the neural correlates of such psycho-
logical abnormalities, but we already knew without neurosci-
entific data that these abnormalities existed, and we had a firm
view of their normative significance. In the future, however,
we may learn more about the causal link between the brain and
behavior, and studies may be devised that are more directly
legally relevant. I suspect that we are unlikely to make sub-
stantial progress with neural assessment of legally relevant
mental content, but we are likely to learn more about capaci-
ties that will bear on excuse or mitigation.
The criteria for both responsibility and competence are
behavioral; therefore, actions speak louder than images. This is
a truism for all criminal responsibility and competence assess-
ments. If the finding of any test or measurement of behavior is
contradicted by actual behavioral evidence, then we must
believe the behavioral evidence because it is more direct and
probative of the law’s behavioral criteria. For example, if the
person behaves rationally in a wide variety of circumstances,
the agent is rational even if the brain appears structurally or
functionally abnormal. We confidently knew that some people
were behaviorally abnormal—such as being psychotic—long
before there were any psychological or neurological tests for
such abnormalities.
An analogy from physical medicine may be instructive. Sup-
pose someone complains about back pain, a subjective symp-
tom, and the question is whether the subject actually does
have back pain. We know that many people with abnormal
spines do not experience back pain, and many people who
complain of back pain have normal spines. If the person is
claiming a disability and the spine looks dreadful, evidence
that the person regularly exercises on a trampoline without dif-
ficulty indicates that there is no disability caused by back pain.
If there is reason to suspect malingering, however, and there is
not clear behavioral evidence of lack of pain, then a completely
normal spine might be of use in deciding whether the claimant
is malingering. Unless the correlation between the image and
the legally relevant behavior is very powerful, however, such
evidence will be of limited help.
If actions speak louder than images, however, what room is
there for introducing neuroevidence in legal cases? Let us
begin with cases in which the behavioral evidence is clear and
permits an equally clear inference about the defendant’s men-
tal state. For example, lay people may not know the technical
term to apply to people who are manifestly out of touch with
reality, but they will readily recognize this unfortunate condi-
tion. No further tests of any sort will be necessary to prove that
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the subject suffers from seriously impaired rationality. In such
cases, neuroevidence will be at most convergent and increase
our confidence in what we already had confidently concluded.
Determining if it is worth collecting the neuroevidence will
depend on whether the cost-benefit analysis justifies obtaining
convergent evidence.
Roper v. Simmons is the most striking example of a case in
which the behavioral evidence was clear.22 In Roper the United
States Supreme Court categorically excluded the death penalty
for capital murderers who killed when they were 16 or 17 years
old on the grounds that adolescents do not deserve the death
penalty.23 The amicus briefs were replete with neuroscience
data showing that the brains of late adolescents are not fully
biologically mature, and advocates used this data to suggest
that adolescent killers could not be fairly put to death.24 Now,
we already knew from common sense observation and from
rigorous behavioral studies that juveniles are on average less
rational than adults. What did the neuroscientific evidence
about the juvenile brain add? It was consistent with the unde-
niable behavioral data and perhaps provided a partial causal
explanation of the behavioral differences. The neuroscience
data was therefore merely additive and only indirectly relevant,
and the Supreme Court did not cite it, except perhaps by impli-
cation when it referred vaguely to “other” scientific evidence.25
Whether adolescents are sufficiently less rational on average
than adults to exclude them categorically from the death
penalty is of course a normative legal question and not a sci-
entific or psychological question. Advocates claimed, however,
that the neuroscience confirmed that adolescents are insuffi-
ciently responsible to be executed,26 thus confusing the posi-
tive and the normative. The neuroscience evidence in no way
independently confirms that adolescents are less responsible. If
the behavioral differences between adolescents and adults were
slight, it would not matter if their brains were quite different.
Similarly, if the behavioral differences were sufficient for moral
and constitutional differential treatment, then it would not
matter if the brains were essentially indistinguishable.
If the behavioral data are not clear, then the potential con-
tribution of neuroscience is large. Unfortunately, it is in just
such cases that neuroscience, at present, is not likely to be of
much help. I term the reason for this the “clear-cut” problem.27
Recall that neuroscientific studies usually start with clear cases
of well-characterized behavior. In such cases, the neural mark-
ers might be quite sensitive to the already clearly identified
behaviors precisely because the behavior is so clear. Less clear
behavior is simply not studied, or the overlap in data about less
clear behavior is greater between
experimental and control sub-
jects. Thus, the neural markers of
clear cases will provide little guid-
ance to resolve behaviorally
ambiguous cases of legally rele-
vant behavior, and they are
unnecessary if the behavior is suf-
ficiently clear.
For example, suppose that in
an insanity defense case the ques-
tion is whether the defendant suf-
fers from a major mental disorder,
such as schizophrenia. In extreme
cases, the behavior will be clear, and no neurodata will be nec-
essary. Investigators have discovered various small but statisti-
cally significant differences in neural structure or function
between people who are clearly suffering from schizophrenia
and those who are not.28 Nonetheless, in a behaviorally unclear
case, the overlap between data on the brains of people with
schizophrenia and people without the disorder is so great that
a scan is insufficiently sensitive to be used for diagnostic pur-
poses. In short, at present, in those cases in which the neuro-
science would be most helpful, it has little to contribute.
Again, this situation may change if neural markers become
more diagnostically sensitive for legally relevant criteria.
Some people think that executive capacity—the congeries
of cognitive and emotional capacities that help to plan and reg-
ulate human behavior—is going to be the Holy Grail that helps
the law determine an offender’s true culpability. After all, there
is an attractive moral case that people with a substantial lack
of these capacities are less culpable, even if their conduct sat-
isfied the prima facie case for the crime charged. Perhaps neu-
roscience can provide specific data previously unavailable to
identify executive capacity differences more precisely.
There are two problems, however. First, significant prob-
lems with executive capacity are readily apparent without test-
ing, and criminal law simply will not adopt fine-grained cul-
pability criteria. Second, the correlation between neuropsycho-
logical tests of executive capacity and actual real world behav-
ior is not terribly strong.29 Only a small fraction of the variance
is accounted for, and the scanning studies will use the types of
tasks the tests use. Consequently, we are far from able to use
neuroscience accurately to assess non-obvious executive
capacity differences that are valid in real world contexts.
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THE RADICAL NEURO-
CHALLENGE: ARE WE 
VICTIMS OF NEURONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES?
This part addresses the
claim and hope alluded to ear-
lier that neuroscience will
cause a paradigm shift in
criminal responsibility by
demonstrating that we are
merely victims of neuronal
circumstances (or some simi-
lar claim that denies human
agency). This claim holds that
we are not the kinds of inten-
tional creatures we think we
are. If our mental states play
no role in our behavior and are simply epiphenomenal, then
traditional notions of responsibility based on mental states and
on actions guided by mental states would be imperiled. But is
the rich explanatory apparatus of intentionality simply a post
hoc rationalization that the brains of hapless homo sapiens
construct to explain what their brains have already done? Will
the criminal justice system as we know it wither away as an
outmoded relic of a prescientific and cruel age? If so, criminal
law is not the only area of law in peril. What will be the fate of
contracts, for example, when a biological machine that was
formerly called a person claims that it should not be bound
because it did not make a contract? The contract is also simply
the outcome of various “neuronal circumstances.”
Given how little we know about the brain-mind and brain-
action connections, to claim that we should radically change
our conceptions of ourselves and our legal doctrines and prac-
tices based on neuroscience is a form of neuroarrogance.
Although I predict that we will see far more numerous
attempts to introduce neuroevidence in the future, I have else-
where argued that for conceptual and scientific reasons, there
is no reason at present to believe that we are not agents.30 It is
possible that we are not agents, but the current science does
not remotely demonstrate that this is true. The burden of per-
suasion is firmly on the proponents of the radical view.
What is more, the radical view entails no positive agenda.
Suppose we are convinced by the mechanistic view that we are
not intentional, rational agents after all.31 What should we do
now? We know that it is an illusion to think that our deliber-
ations and intentions have any causal efficacy in the world. We
also know, however, that we experience sensations—such as
pleasure and pain—and care about what happens to us and to
the world. We cannot just sit quietly and wait for our brains to
activate, for determinism to happen. We must and will delib-
erate and act.
Even if we thought that the radical view was correct and
standard notions of genuine moral responsibility and desert
were therefore impossible, we might still believe that the law
would not necessarily have to give up the concept of incen-
tives. Indeed, Greene and Cohen concede that we would have
to keep punishing people for practical purposes.32 Such an
account would be consistent with “black box” accounts of eco-
nomic incentives that simply depend on the relation between
inputs and outputs without considering the mind as a media-
tor between the two. For those who believe that a thoroughly
naturalized account of human behavior entails complete con-
sequentialism, this conclusion might be welcomed.
On the other hand, this view seems to entail the same inter-
nal contradiction just explored. What is the nature of the agent
that is discovering the laws governing how incentives shape
behavior? Could understanding and providing incentives via
social norms and legal rules simply be epiphenomenal inter-
pretations of what the brain has already done? How do we
decide which behaviors to reward or punish? What role does
reason—a property of thoughts and agents, not a property of
brains—play in this decision?
If the truth of pure mechanism is a premise in deciding
what to do, no particular moral, legal, or political conclusions
follow from it.33 The radical view provides no guide as to how
one should live or how one should respond to the truth of
reductive mechanism. Normativity depends on reason and,
thus, the radical view is normatively inert. If reasons do not
matter, then we have no reason to adopt any particular morals,
politics or legal rules, or to do anything at all.
Given what we know and have reason to do, the allegedly
disappearing person remains fully visible and necessarily con-
tinues to act for good reasons, including the reasons currently
to reject the radical view. We are not Pinocchios, and our
brains are not Geppettos pulling the strings.
THE CASE FOR CAUTIOUS NEUROLAW OPTIMISM
Despite having claimed that we should be exceptionally
cautious about the current contributions that neuroscience can
make to criminal law policy, doctrine, and adjudication, I am
modestly optimistic about the near and intermediate term con-
tributions neuroscience can potentially make to our ordinary,
traditional, folk-psychological legal system. In other words,
neuroscience may make a positive contribution even though
there has been no paradigm shift in thinking about the nature
of the person and the criteria for criminal responsibility. The
legal regime to which neuroscience will contribute will con-
tinue to take people seriously as people—as autonomous
agents who may fairly be blamed and punished based on their
mental states and actions.
In general, the hope is that over time there will be feedback
between the folk-psychological criteria and the neuroscientific
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data. Each might inform the other. Conceptual work on men-
tal states might suggest new neuroscientific studies, for exam-
ple, and the neuroscientific studies might help refine the folk-
psychological categories. The ultimate goal would be a reflec-
tive, conceptual-empirical equilibrium.
More specifically, there are four types of situations in which
neuroscience may be of assistance: (a) data indicating that the
folk-psychological assumption underlying a legal rule is incor-
rect; (b) data suggesting the need for new or reformed legal
doctrine; (c) evidence that helps adjudicate an individual case;
and (d) data that help efficient adjudication or administration
of criminal justice.
Many criminal law doctrines are based on folk-psychologi-
cal assumptions about behavior that may prove to be incorrect.
If so, the doctrine should change. For example, it is commonly
assumed that agents intend the natural and probable conse-
quences of their actions. In many or most cases it seems that
they do, but neuroscience may help in the future to demon-
strate that this assumption is true far less frequently than we
think. In that case, the rebuttable presumption used to help the
prosecution prove intent should be softened or used with more
caution.
Second, neuroscientific data may suggest the need for new
or reformed legal doctrine. For example, control tests for legal
insanity have been disfavored for some decades because they
are ill understood and hard to assess. It is at present impossi-
ble to distinguish “cannot” from “will not.” Perhaps neurosci-
entific information will help to demonstrate and to prove the
existence of control difficulties that are independent of cogni-
tive incapacities. If so, then perhaps control tests are justified
and can be rationally assessed after all. More generally, perhaps
a larger percentage of offenders than we currently believe have
such grave control difficulties that they deserve a generic mit-
igation claim that is not available in criminal law today. Neu-
roscience might help us discover that fact. If that were true,
justice would be served by adopting a generic mitigating doc-
trine. On the other hand, if it turns out that such difficulties
are not so common, we could be more confident of the justice
of current doctrine.
Third, neuroscience might provide data to help adjudicate
individual cases. Consider the insanity defense again. As in
United States v. Hinckley,34 there is often dispute about
whether a defendant claiming legal insanity suffered from a
mental disorder, which disorder the defendant suffered from,
and how severe the disorder was.35 At present, these questions
must be resolved entirely behaviorally, and there is often room
for considerable disagreement about inferences drawn from
the defendant’s actions, including utterances. In the future,
neuroscience might help resolve such questions if the clear-
cut-problem difficulty can be solved. As mentioned previously,
however, in the foreseeable future, I doubt that neuroscience
will be able to help identify the presence or absence of specific
mentes reae.
Finally, neuroscience might help us to implement current
policy more efficiently. For example, the criminal justice sys-
tem makes predictions about future dangerous behavior for
purposes of bail, sentencing (including capital sentencing),
and parole. If we have already decided that it is justified to use
dangerousness predictions to make such decisions, it is hard to
imagine a rational argument for doing it less accurately if we
are in fact able to do it more accurately. Behavioral prediction
techniques already exist. The question is whether neuroscien-
tific variables can add value by increasing the accuracy of such
predictions considering the cost of gathering such data. It is
perfectly plausible that in the future they may do so, and thus,
decisions will be more accurate and just.36
CONCLUSION
At present, neuroscience has little to contribute to more just
and accurate criminal law decision making concerning policy,
doctrine and individual case adjudication. This was the con-
clusion reached when I tentatively identified “brain overclaim
syndrome” five years ago, and it remains true today. In the
future, however, as neuroscience and the philosophies of mind
and action mutually mature and inform one another, neuro-
science will help us understand criminal behavior. Although
no radical transformation of criminal justice is likely to occur,
neuroscience can inform criminal justice as long as it is rele-
vant to law and translated into the law’s folk-psychological
framework and criteria.
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